时间：2016年5月5日（下周四）下午2点半
地点：1号楼305
报告人：鲁建坤博士
报告论文：Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: theory and evidence”（By Eanuele Bracco， et.al)。
论文摘要：Thispaper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment betweendifferent
tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are:
(i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent competence, and (ii) realistically,
grants are unobservable to voters. In this setting, the national government will use the grant as an instrument
to manipulate the public good signal for the benefit of aligned local incumbents and challengers. Then, aligned
municipalities receive more grants, with this effect being stronger before elections, and the probability that the
aligned local incumbent is re-elected is higher. These predictions are tested using a regression discontinuity
design on a new data-set on Italian municipalities. At a second empirical stage, the national grant to
municipalities is instrumented with an alignment indicator, allowing estimation of a flypaper effect for Italian
municipalities.
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